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Pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellees and Cross-
Appellants Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. ("GCE" or the "Company"), Martin Mathis, Michael 
Denoyer and Don Saunders1 (collectively "Appellees") hereby submit this reply brief in 
connection with the matter captioned above. 
I. REPLY ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants have made three arguments on cross-appeal: First, 
Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Appellants' claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in connection with the refund of certain tax revenues paid 
to the state of Arizona (the "Arizona Tax Refund"). Second, the expert testimony of Appellant's 
accounting expert, Derk Rasmussen, should have been stricken as unhelpful to the trier of fact. 
Finally, the trial court should have dismissed all claims as to the individual defendants, who are 
merely shareholders of GCE. Appellees will reply to Appellant's arguments on these issues in 
the order identified.2 
1
 Donald Saunders was originally a defendant in this action. Mr. Saunders died on 
December 29, 2000. On March 15, 2001, the Court granted Appellant's Motion for Substitution 
of Parties, and ordered that Glen Perez, the personal representative of the Estate of Donald 
Saunders, and the Estate of Donald Saunders, be substituted as defendants in the stead of 
defendant Donald Saunders. (Rec. at 2062-2065.) 
2
 Given the nature of this brief as a reply on Appellees' cross-appeal, they respond only 
to Appellant's arguments to the issues raised by Appellees on cross-appeal. While Appellees 
take issue with much of Appellant's reply on the issues he has raised on appeal, Appellees 
reserve comment upon those issues until oral argument. 
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B. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED APPELLANT'S 
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN CONNECTION WITH THE ARIZONA 
TAX REFUND ON SEVERAL GROUNDS. 
1. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under Utah Law. 
The parties have fully expounded Utah law on the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in their briefs on appeal, and Appellees will not revisit that law at length here. Suffice it 
to say that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in all contracts and 
requires that the parties to the contract do nothing intentionally or purposely to injure or destroy 
the other party's right to receive the benefits of the contract. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 
871 P.2d 1041, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Depriving a party of its contractual rights for a 
legitimate or good faith reason does not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Brown v. Weiss, 871 P.2d 552, 564 n.18 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). So long as a party acts 
reasonably and in good faith and in a manner consistent with the purpose of the contract and the 
justified expectations of the other party, the implied covenant is not violated.3 Olympus Hills 
Shopping Or, Ltd. V. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 457-58 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) Summary judgment is properly granted when no rational trier of fact could reasonably 
conclude that a party to a contract acted unreasonably or in bad faith to deny the other party the 
benefits justifiably expected under the contract. See, e.g., Dubois v. Grand Central, 872 P.2d 
Appellant continues to argue that to satisfy the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, a party must not only not act unreasonably or in bad faith, it must also act reasonably 
and in good faith. He claims that there is a "subtle distinction" between acting in good faith and 
not acting in bad faith, but offers no legal authority for this proposition. In fact, the Restatement 
(2d) of Contracts uses the concepts of good faith and bad faith as exclusive opposites, not 
allowing for an interpretation of some gray area in between. See Restatement (2d) of Contracts, 
§205 cmt. a (good faith excludes conduct described as "bad faith"), cmt.c (discussing good faith 
versus bad faith negotiation), and cmt. d (discussing good faith versus bad faith performance). 
1073,1078-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (affirming grant of summary judgment on implied covenant 
claim); Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah 1992) (same). 
Appellant's claim under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails because 
no rational fact finder could conclude that Appellees intentionally or purposely did or failed to 
do anything that unreasonably interfered with Appellant's justified expectations with respect to 
the Arizona Tax Refund. Without resorting to another recitation of the facts described in 
Appellees' brief on appeal, certain factual highlights are summarized below. 
2. Controlling Undisputed Material Facts 
Appellant signed the Buy-Sell Agreement in 1986. (Rec. at 288-93.) The Buy-Sell 
Agreement provided that, upon the termination of Appellant's employment with GCE, his stock 
therein would be purchased by the Company. (Rec. at 293.) GCE would pay a percentage of the 
net book value of the stock at the time of termination.4 (Rec. at 292.) The net book value of 
the company was to be determined by GCE's outside CPA according to generally accepted 
accounting principles ("GAAP"). The determination by the accountant was to be conclusive of 
the net book value of GCE. (Id.) 
From the inception of Appellant's employment with GCE, the Company had paid certain 
taxes to the state of Arizona, including an admissions tax, which GCE passed on to its customers. 
In 1990, while Appellant was still an officer and director of the company, GCE protested or 
appealed certain of its tax payments to the state of Arizona, including the payment of the 
admissions tax. (Rec. at 1737.112-1737.114.) 
4
 In fact, when GCE actually bought the stock, the purchase price, as set by the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, was 140% of net book value. 
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Appellant knew of the appeal and was kept informed as to its status.5 (Rec. at 1794, 
1870.) Similarly, GCE's accountant, Nyle Willis, knew of the appeal. (Rec. at 1807-09,1868.) 
While there may be some confusion as to when GCE withdrew its appeal of the admissions tax, 
if ever, certain critical facts are undisputed. For example, Willis did not identify the appeal as an 
asset on GCE's books at any time prior to the termination of Appellant's employment6 because 
any benefit to GCE of the appeal was simply too uncertain. (Rec. at 1808, 1868.) Additionally, 
at the time Appellant's employment was terminated, GCE was still paying, and expected to 
continue paying, the admissions tax. (Rec. at 1737.48, 1737.109.) 
When Appellant left GCE's employ, he personally negotiated the terms of his separation. 
He received an initial estimate of the purchase price of his stock, which was higher than the price 
ultimately agreed upon. He also received severance pay to which he was not entitled, and 
negotiated a waiver by GCE of the non-compete provisions of the Employment Agreement. 
(Rec. at 417.) In exchange, Appellant signed an agreement (the "Separation Agreement") which 
provided that Appellant was receiving these benefits "in lieu of any other amounts or benefits 
which [may have been] due from [GCE] as provided in the Employment Agreement or 
otherwise . . . . " (Appellant's Addendum at 1497 [hereinafter Add.](emphasis added).) 
For reasons unrelated to any action by GCE, the Arizona Supreme Court in 1995 ruled 
that the admissions tax was improperly levied and collected. Consequently, almost three years 
after the termination of Appellant's employment, GCE learned that it would actually receive the 
Arizona Tax Refund. 
5
 Which Appellant denies that he was "actively" involved in the appeal and was not 
"regularly" advised of its status, he does not categorically deny knowing of the appeal. (Rec. at 
1905.) 
6
 In fact, Willis never recorded the Arizona tax refund as an asset on GCE's books until 
GCE actually received the money in 1995 and 1996. 
3. No Rational Finder of Fact Could Conclude that Appellant had a Reasonable 
Expectation to Participate in the Arizona Tax Refund. 
The trial court should have granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment on 
Appellant's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect 
to the Arizona Tax Refund, because Appellant lacks any evidence to support his claim. Under 
the undisputed facts, Appellant simply could not have had a reasonable and justifiable 
expectation that the company's accountant would artificially increase net book value in 1992 by 
characterizing the refund claim as an asset when plainly it was not. Moreover, Appellant could 
not have had a reasonable and justifiable expectation that he would share in the refund when it 
became an asset years after his termination. 
The best evidence that GCE acted in good faith ( or did not act in bad faith) is the 
undisputed fact that it did not make the decision about whether to characterize the tax appeal as 
an asset; rather, its outside CPA, Nyle Willis, did under the terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
Moreover, Mr. Willis made the decision not to characterize the admissions tax appeal as an asset 
well before Appellant's termination. 
The Buy-Sell Agreement was very clear in describing how the purchase price for 
Appellant's stock would be determined: GCE's outside CPA, Nyle Willis, would establish the 
net book value of the company based upon GAAP at the time his employment was terminated. 
(Rec. at 292-93.) This is precisely what happened. Significantly, when Willis was calculating 
the net book value for purposes of purchasing Appellant's stock, he knew that GCE had 
protested taxes paid to the state of Arizona. He did not, however, consider that protest or the 
possibility of a refund as a bookable asset of the company because GCE's actual receipt of any 
money from the refund was a remote contingency. (Rec. at 1737.111-1737.113,1807-08,1868.)7 
Such a refund would have required a change in the then-existing law. Additionally, even if the 
law changed, GCE might have been required to refund the taxes to customers rather than retain 
the funds itself. For those reasons, Willis did not consider the possibility of a refund an asset and 
did not include an estimation of the refund in the net book value of GCE. Consequently, it did 
not affect the purchase price of the Appellant's stock under the Buy-Sell Agreement when he left 
GCE in 1992. 
Appellant has no evidence that GCE's accountant failed to follow GAAP in his treatment 
of the Arizona Tax Refund prior to his separation from GCE.8 Additionally, Appellant himself 
acknowledged his awareness of the refund claim. Although he stated that he was not "actively 
involved" in the claim and was not "regularly" advised of its status, he never denied knowledge 
of the claim or occasional advice about its status. (Rec. at 1794, 1905.) Significantly, Appellant 
did not state, even in conclusory terms, that it was his expectation that the refund should have 
been included in the calculation of his buyout. (Rec. at 1904-06.) Consequently, there is no 
evidence of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by GCE in connection 
with the Buy-Sell Agreement, and on this ground, GCE was entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing Appellant's claims. 
To the extent that Appellant bases his implied covenant claim on facts arising after his 
separation in 1992, it is even less tenable. When he left GCE, Appellant signed the Separation 
Agreement. By its terms, the Separation Agreement replaced the Buy-Sell Agreement and 
7
 As discussed below, Appellant himself was aware of the tax protest made by GCE. See 
sections I.B.4 and LB.5., infra. 
8
 As discussed in section C2, infra, Appellant also lacks any evidence that GCE was 
required to recalculate the net book value or restate its income for prior years when it learned of 
the Arizona Tax Refund in 1995. 
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"embodie[d] the entire agreement between the [GCE and Appellant] with respect to" Appellant's 
separation from GCE and the company's purchase of his stock. (Add. at 1495.) In other words, 
under no theory could Appellant raise a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing based upon the Buy-Sell Agreement after the execution of the Separation 
Agreement. See Republic Group v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P. 2d 285, 289-90 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Moreover, Appellant cannot argue that he was entitled to any portion of the Arizona Tax 
Refund under the Separation Agreement, which specifically identified the purchase price of the 
stock and further provided that Appellant accepted that amount "in lieu of any other amounts" 
owed him by GCE. (Add. at 1497.) Indeed, the undisputed facts show that Appellant negotiated 
an agreement for the purchase price for his stock, along with other consideration, and that GCE 
has fully complied with that agreement.9 When the Separation Agreement was negotiated, 
Appellant knew of the potential Arizona Tax Refund and of the company's accounting treatment 
of the refund. (Rec. at 1737.101, 1737.114, 1807-09, 1868-70; see also Rec. at 19041(6 
(Appellant not ''actively" but somewhat involved.)) Further, it is undisputed that when GCE 
finally did receive the Arizona Tax Refund, approximately three years after execution of the 
Separation Agreement, nothing in GAAP required GCE to recalculate the net book value of the 
company in 1992 or the purchase price of Appellant's stock. (Rec. at 1183-84, 1480 (depo. 
Transcript at p.215-16, 236-37.) Consequently, Appellant at no time had any reasonable 
expectation that he would receive a portion of the Arizona Tax Refund, and his claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should have been dismissed by the trial 
court. 
9
 Appellant continued to accept payments made pursuant to the Separation Agreement 
even after commencing this lawsuit. 
4. Appellant Relinquished Any Right he had to the Arizona Tax Refund by Entering 
into the Separation Agreement. 
Upon undisputed facts, any reasonable fact finder would also have to conclude that 
Appellant waived or otherwise relinquished any claim to the Arizona Tax Refund. Appellant 
knew that the purchase price was subject to some debate, because the price he ultimately agreed 
to accept was less than the price originally presented him. (Rec. at 299-301,417.) Moreover, 
Appellant knew, constructively as an officer and director of GCE and by reason of his actual 
knowledge, about GCE's appeal of the admissions tax, and had been advised of the status of the 
appeal. (Rec. at 1794,1870; see also Rec. at 1904 [^6 (Appellant not "actively" but somewhat 
involved.)) There is absolutely no reason that Appellant could not have raised the issue of the 
valuation of the Arizona Tax Refund as a function of the purchase price at the time of his 
termination, but he did not do so. Rather, he negotiated the Separation Agreement and accepted 
the purchase price of his stock and other valuable consideration "in lieu of any other amounts or 
benefits which [may have been] due from [GCE] as provided in the Employment Agreement or 
otherwise . . . . " (Add. at 1497. (emphasis added).) 
Whether characterized as an accord and satisfaction, a waiver, or settlement, Appellant 
gave up his right to question the valuation of GCE and the purchase price of the stock when he 
entered into the Separation Agreement. The analysis applied by the trial court with respect to 
Appellant's claims under the Employment Agreement or other accounting issues relating to the 
purchase price of the stock applies with equal force to the Arizona Tax Refund because 
Appellant had constructive knowledge, if not actual knowledge, of the all the facts necessary to 
challenge the determination of the net book value of GCE. He did not do so in 1992, and should 
not be allowed to do so now. 
5. "Imputation" of Knowledge of GCE's Tax Counsel to it Officers and Directors 
Does Not Save Appellant's Claim. 
Appellant's argument on the issue of imputation is both irrelevant and misses the point. 
Imputation is a red herring because even if everyone knew the tax appeal was extant, that 
knowledge clearly would not have changed the calculation of Appellant's buyout, (i.e. 
knowledge of the appeal would not have made it an asset). Indeed, Willis believed the appeal 
was still active when he calculated the buyout. (Rec. at 1808,1868.) Furthermore, the issue is 
not only what information was available to Appellees at or after the termination of Appellant's 
employment. The issue is what Appellant knew or constructively knew at the time his 
employment at GCE ended, and the effect of that knowledge on his knowing relinquishment of 
his rights under the Buy-Sell Agreement.10 
As an officer and director of GCE, Appellant had actual knowledge from the inception of 
the company that GCE was paying the admissions tax. (Rec. at 1737.114, 1870.) He also had 
actual or constructive knowledge in 1990 that the company had protested and appealed the 
admissions tax. (Rec. at 1794, 1869-70.) He was advised along with other GCE officers and 
directors, of developments relating to the appeal of the admissions tax also until the time of the 
separation of his employment. Consequently, even assuming a deterioration in Appellant's 
relationship with the other directors of GCE in the period just prior to his separation from the 
company, Appellant had at least the same constructive knowledge of the Arizona Tax Refund as 
the other officers and directors of GCE. In other words, when he signed the Separation 
The issue of imputed knowledge was raised sua sponte by the trial court to support the 
possibility that the officers and directors had constructive knowledge of the potential Arizona 
Tax Refund and, therefore, could conceivably have acted in bad faith. Imputed knowledge, 
however, is a two-edged sword because knowledge imputed to the officers and directors of GCE 
would necessarily have been imputed to Appellant, at least until early 1992, before the events 
that led to the separation of his employment. 
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Agreement, he knew of the admissions tax and of GCE's appeal of the admissions tax. 
Accordingly, if knowledge of GCE's tax counsel is imputed to the individual defendants, it must 
also be imputed to Appellant, which supports GCE defenses of accord and satisfaction and 
waiver. 
6. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing with Respect to the Buy-
Sell Agreement Terminated When that Agreement Terminated. 
To find a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, there must be an 
underlying contract. Republic Group, 883 P.2d at 289. It is undisputed that the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, the contract upon which Appellant relies on in stating his claim for breach of the 
implied covenant, terminated in 1992. Indeed, the Separation Agreement specifically provides 
that it replaced the Buy-Sell Agreement and "embodie[d] the entire agreement between [GCE 
and Appellant] with respect to the subject matter" of, among other things, the purchase price of 
the stock. (Add. at 1495.) Consequently, any obligations or covenants, including constructive or 
implied obligations or covenants, associated with the Buy-Sell Agreement were also terminated. 
While it is true that there was an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between 
Appellant and Appellees in 1995, that covenant arose from the Separation Agreement, not the 
Buy-Sell Agreement. There can be no dispute that Appellant received everything he could have 
reasonably expected to receive under the Separation Agreement.11 
11
 In other words, the Arizona Tax Refund was "beyond the fixing of values" in 
connection with the determination of net book value for purposes of the Buy-Sell Agreement in 
1992. By 1995,when GCE actually began receiving the Arizona Tax Refund, the Separation 
Agreement, not the Buy-Sell Agreement was the operative contract, and Appellant's reasonable 
expectations as to the stock purchase price were clear. 
C. THE TESTIMONY OF DERK RASMUSSEN WAS SO UNRELIABLE AS 
TO BE UNHELPFUL TO THE TRIER OF FACT AND, THEREFORE, 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRICKEN. 
While it is certainly true that a trial court has wide latitude and discretion in admitting 
expert testimony, that discretion is not wholly unfettered. Rather, a trial court abuses its 
discretion when it neglects its role as a "gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize proffered evidence." 
Franklin v. Stevenson, 987 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 778 
(Utah 1991)). As a gatekeeper, it is the trial court's responsibility to ensure that expert testimony 
offered by a party meets the standard for admissibility. Id. The standard is that, at a minimum, 
the evidence must "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue." Utah R. Evid. 702. A trial court abuses its discretion when it allows evidence that is not 
helpful to the trier of fact or if it would confuse the issues or mislead the jury. See, e.g., 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., P.3d , 2001 UT 89, 86, cert, denied, 122 S.Ct. 
2326 (2002); State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1989). If the term "helpful" is to 
have any meaning at all, it must at least mean that the expert evidence is relevant and minimally 
reliable.12 See, e.g., Campbell, 2001 UT 89, 86. Similarly, if the evidence is inaccurate, 
misleading or confusing, it cannot be helpful. Id. 
The trial court in this case abused its discretion by failing to strike the testimony of 
Appellant's accounting expert, Derk Rasmussen. Mr. Rasmussen's testimony relied upon 
superseded and obsolete accounting principles, misapplied black letter accounting principles and 
was irrelevant to the issues in controversy. As such, his testimony did not meet the helpfulness 
standard of Rule 702 and should have been stricken. 
In fact, if the evidence is not relevant, it is not admissible at all. Utah R. Evid. 402. 
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In his brief, Appellant does not address Appellees' specific arguments about Mr. 
Rasmussen's opinion testimony. Rather, he makes the general and cursory statement that 
Appellees' arguments go to the issue of credibility, not admissibility. In reality, Appellees argue 
that Mr. Rasmussen's testimony is so unreliable and irrelevant that it cannot overcome the hurdle 
of admissibility and should have been stricken by the trial court. In this reply, Appellees focus 
on Mr. Rasmussen's testimony with respect to the Arizona Tax Refund, although the arguments 
made on that issue apply with equal force to the other accounting issues upon which Mr. 
Rasmussen opined. 
1. Mr. Rasmussen Relied Upon Outdated Accounting Principles and Misapplied 
Black Letter Accounting Standards. 
Mr. Rasmussen relied upon a superseded accounting standard when he stated that the 
Arizona Tax Refund should have been treated as a "prior period adjustment." He identified 
Accounting Principles Board Opinion ("APB Op.") No. 9 for this proposition. (Rec. at 1480 
(depo. transcript at 216).) Upon cross-examination13, however, Mr. Rasmussen subsequently 
admitted that APB Op. No. 9 had been superseded nearly twenty five years earlier by Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standard ("FAS") No. 16. (Rec. at 1480 (depo. transcript at 216, 219).) 
By relying upon such an outdated accounting principle, Mr. Rasmussen's testimony was likely 
only to confuse and mislead the fact finder, not to assist it in understanding the issues. 
Additionally, in discussing FAS No. 16 at his deposition, Mr. Rasmussen also conceded 
that no relevant exception applied to the rule that items of profit or loss recognized during a 
period are to be included in the determination of income for that period. (Rec. at 1478 (depo. 
13
 It is unclear why Appellant argues that the unreliable nature of Mr. Rasmussen's 
testimony was revealed primarily upon cross-examination. He cites no authority for the idea that 
cross-examination at a deposition is an improper way of demonstrating unhelpfulness or 
unreliability. 
transcript at 233-34).) This concession eviscerated his own testimony that the Arizona Tax 
Refund should have been treated as a prior period adjustment. More significantly, however, it 
demonstrates a glaring unfamiliarity with basic accounting principles. The proffer of so-called 
"expert" accounting testimony so out of conformity with recognized accounting standards could 
only serve to confuse and mislead and should have been stricken by the trial court. 
2. Mr. Rasmussen Offered Testimony that was Wholly Irrelevant and Therefore 
Confusing to the Finder of Fact. 
Despite going on at length in his expert affidavit and at his deposition regarding the 
vagaries of "prior period adjustment," Mr. Rasmussen then admitted that no accounting principle 
or standard would have required GCE to recalculate the purchase price of his stock in connection 
with the Buy-Sell Agreement.14 (See Rec. at 1478 (depo. transcript at 236-37).) In other words, 
Mr. Rasmussen expounded upon on number of accounting principles, albeit outdated and 
inappropriate for the facts at hand, none of which had any bearing upon the ultimate issue - -
should the purchase price GCE paid for Appellant's stock have been adjusted in 1995 when GCE 
received the Arizona Tax Refund. This fact alone clearly demonstrates the confusing, misleading 
and unhelpful nature of Mr. Rasmussen's testimony and shows why the trial court should have 
stricken his opinion testimony.15 
Mr. Rasmussen also expressed his (essentially personal) opinion as to other accounting 
issues, while conceding that no recognized accounting standard required the recalculation of the 
purchase price of Appellant's stock in GCE. See Br. of Appellees at 59 (regarding accounting 
treatment of a covenant not to compete obtained by GCE). 
This argument applies with equal force to Mr. Rasmussen's testimony regarding the 
accounting treatment of a covenant not to compete GCE obtained from Ron Smith when the 
company was joined. Since the accounting treatment given the covenant, whatever it was, did 
not affect the purchase price paid to Appellant for his stock, Mr. Rasmussen's testimony on this 
point is irrelevant, unhelpful and misleading. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING APPELLANT'S CONTRACT CLAIMS 
AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
LEGAL BASIS FOR THOSE CLAIMS. 
The trial court declined to grant Appellees' motion for summary judgment on Appellant's 
contract claims against the individual defendants. In so doing, the trial court ignored black letter 
Utah law that shareholders are not liable for the contractual obligations of a corporation. 
Reedeker v. Salisbury. 952 P.2d 577, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The trial court offered no 
meaningful explanation for its decision, stating only that GCE was a Subchapter S corporation 
and that the funds received by GCE in connection with the Arizona Tax Refund were all 
distributed to the individual defendants as shareholders. (Rec. at 1748.) 
Out of this vague statement, Appellant argues that what the trial court must have meant is 
that GCE was the alter ego of the individual defendants. This argument, which was never made 
by Appellant below or considered by the trial court, is simply no basis for denying Appellees' 
motion to dismiss the claims against the individual defendants. 
Appellant properly states the legal standard for disregarding the corporate form and 
finding that a corporation is actually the alter ego of one or more defendants. To disregard a 
corporate entity as an alter ego, two circumstances must be shown. First, there must be such a 
unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the 
individual(s) no longer exist. Second, if observed, the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in inequity. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 
P.2d 42, 46 (Utah 1988); Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan. 872 P.2 487, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Appellant failed, however, to point out that courts must only reluctantly and cautiously pierce the 
corporate veil under an alter ego theory. James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 46 (citing Colman v. 
Cohnan, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)). 
Appellant has submitted absolutely no evidence with respect to the first prong of the alter 
ego test. To establish a "unity of interest and ownership," courts examine numerous factors such 
as under-capitalization of a one-person corporation, failure to follow corporate formalities, 
nonpayment of dividends, siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant shareholder, 
nonfunctioning officers and directors and an absence of corporate records. See Colman, 743 
P.2d at 786. Appellant has offered no evidence with respect to any of these factors. To the 
contrary, any facts in the record with respect to GCE's corporate form suggest that GCE was a 
corporation with several shareholders with varying interests in a corporation with functioning 
and informed officers and directors. (See Rec. at 425-27, 558,1310-11.) Appellant's one thin 
reed is the trial court's passing observation that GCE is a small Subchapter S corporation that 
paid out the Arizona Tax Refund to its shareholders. This is hardly sufficient to find GCE an 
alter ego of the individual defendants. 
In addition to the foregoing, Appellant is estopped from asserting an alter ego theory 
against GCE or the individual Defendants. The alter ego doctrine is designed to allow recovery 
for fraudulent or inequitable conduct by shareholders who themselves ignore the form of a 
corporation they use for improper purposes. It cannot be used by a former shareholder, officer 
and director who complains of conduct by a corporation that he helped manage. In fact, such a 
shareholder is estopped from asserting a claim as an alter ego theory. See Communist Party of 
the United States v. 522 Valencia, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). (those 
who have expressly or impliedly recognized existence of corporation estopped from asserting 
alter ego theory.) 
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After three motions for summary judgment, Appellant has failed to offer any evidence of 
a contractual relationship between himself and any of the individual defendants. He has also 
failed to offer any evidence of a unity of interest and ownership such that GCE should be 
considered the later ego of the individual defendants. Moreover, he should be estopped from 
denying the existence of a corporation he helped manage. Consequently, the trial courts denial 
of Appellees' motion for summary judgment dismissing claims against the individual defendants 
should be reversed and judgment granted in favor of the individuals. 
II. CONCLUSION 
Appellees were entitled to summary judgment on Appellant's claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the Arizona Tax Refund. 
Appellant had no reasonable and justifiable expectation that the refund would affect the purchase 
price of this GCE stock when he left the company in 1992, and even less when the Arizona Tax 
Refund became a reality in 1995 and 1996. Moreover, under the Separation Agreement, he 
waived whatever right he had to the Arizona Tax Refund. The trial court also should have 
stricken the "expert" testimony of Derk Rasmussen as unhelpful and irrelevant. Mr. Rasmussen 
relied upon outdated and inappropriate accounting principles to arrive at opinions irrelevant to 
the ultimate issues in this case. As such, his testimony was misleading and confusing and could 
not be helpful to the trier of fact. Finally, because Appellant lacks any evidence of a contract 
between himself and the individual Defendants, or any evidence to show that GCE is the alter 
ego of the individual Defendants, any claims against the individual Defendants must be 
dismissed. 
DATED: January ^ 1,2003. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
John A. Anderson 
Matthew M. Durham 
Attorneys for Defendant Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
(Filed Under Seal) on the following named person(s) on the date indicated below by 
HI mailing with postage prepaid 
• hand delivery 
• facsimile transmission 
• overnight delivery 
to said person(s) a true copy thereof, contained in a sealed envelope, addressed to said person(s) 
at their last-known address(es) indicated below. 
Peter Stirba 
Brady L. Rasmussen 
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED: January 31, 2003. 
i 
